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A NE W ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
REGULATION: RENT EXTRACTION 
RATHER THAN RENT CREATION 
Douglas Ginsburg* 
MoNEY FOR NoTinNG: PoLmc1ANs, RENT EXTRACTION, AND 
POLITICAL EXTORTION. By Fred S. McChesney. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 1997.  Pp. xi, 216. $3 5. 
O nce upon a time, people believed that the government regu­
lated various industries in " the public interest." The idea was that 
certain conditions, s uch as " natural monopoly" or the ability to ex­
ternalize significant costs , caused markets to fail and governments 
to step in to correct that failure.1 
Econmnic regulation predicated upon market failure can be 
dated conveniently to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,2 in 
which the Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commis­
sion to regulate railroads in the interests of shippers, principally 
farmers and small businesses.3 The legal notion of " affectation with 
the public interest" dates back much further, of course;4 and the 
concept of " market failure" was not introduced in those terms until 
a good deal later.5 But it is a useful simplification to say that for 
roughly eighty years (1885-1965), the market failure story, couched 
in various terms , was widely accepted.6 
Toward the end of that period, however, econmnists began to 
point out certain problems with the story. For example, some noted 
that there was no plausible claim of market failure in certain regu­
lated industries,  such as motor carriers and airlines, suggesting that 
regulation must be explained by some other factor.7 And, in an 
industry in which the market failure s tory seemed facially plausible 
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- local distribution of electricity - George Stigler and Claire 
Friedland cast doubt upon the assumption that regulation had any 
appreciable effect upon price.8 Indeed, by the early 1970s, alterna­
tive explanations for, or ways of understanding, economic regu­
lation were emerging with some frequency.9 
The new learning that emerged in the early 1970s as "the eco­
nomic theory of regulation" can justly be attributed to George 
Stigler, which is not to say that important refinements were not ad­
ded by others. It proceeds from the historical observation that reg­
ulation was in many instances sought by, rather than imposed upon, 
the regulated industry, which is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
public interest story.10 In the new learning, regulation, whether 
sought by industry or imposed upon it, "is designed and operated 
primarily for [the regulated firms'] benefit,"11 and to the consum­
ers' detriment. Regulation generates rents for the regulated indus­
try, paid for by consumers, of which the politicians get a portion in 
the form of contributions from the regulated firms.12 In Fred 
McChesney's13 succinct synopsis of the Stiglerian model: "If ex­
pected political rents net of the costs of organizing and procuring 
favorable regulation are positive, then producers will demand regu­
lation. If payments sufficient to compensate politicians for the costs 
of creating regulation are forthcoming, they will supply it" (p. 9). 
In other words, regulation is an item of trade, supplied by politi­
cians who traffic in the state's monopoly on the use of force, and 
demanded by producers who can use regulation to extract rents 
from consumers. Regulation occurs because consumers, being nu-
8. See George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of 
Electricity, 5 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1962). 
9. See, e.g., William S. Comanor & Bridger M. Mitchell, The Costs of Planning: The FCC 
and Cable Television, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 177 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 
2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMr. SCI. 22 (1971); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regula· 
tion, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMr. SCI. 3 (1971). 
10. See Stigler, supra note 9, at 3. 
11. Id. 
12. Regulation can create rents in two ways. Frrst, regulation can create monopolies or 
stable cartels, which allow producers to lower output, increase price above marginal cost, and 
capture increased profits. "It is the state's ability to apply the force of law to any monopoliz· 
ing arrangement that frequently makes regulation a superior mechanism for creating rents." 
P. 11. Second, regulation can create rents "inframarginally." As McChesney explains: 
[R]egulatory measures are identified that increase costs for all firms, but proportionately 
more for marginal firms . . . •  A regulation increasing the cost of labor, for example, will 
affect firms with relatively large capital investments less than those using proportionately 
more labor than capital in production. Higher overall costs due to regulation mean 
higher prices to consumers, and so a lower quantity produced. Reduced quantities mean 
that rents earned on some existing production will be lost because of regulation. But for 
capital intensive producers, costs may rise less than prices do, creating new rents exceed· 
ing the old rents lost. To inframarginal, capital-intensive producers, regulation is advan· 
tageous . . . .  
P. 15 (citations omitted). 
13. Professor, Cornell Law School. 
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merous and each having a small stake in preventing it, are typically 
not organized as effectively as producers and hence systematically 
lose in the legislative struggle. 
The economic theory of regulation is as familiar and obvious to 
lawyers and economists educated in the last twenty-five years as 
was the market failure story to the immediately preceding genera­
tion. Now comes Fred McChesney, in Money for Nothing: Politi­
cians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion, to say that the rent­
creation story cannot stand alone; it is but a part of a larger and 
more powerful economic theory of regulation based upon rent 
extraction. 
Mcchesney demonstrates first that the rent-creation model of 
regulation is deficient in several respects (pp. 17-19). As an empiri­
cal matter, it is incapable of explaining the great wave of health, 
safety, environmental, and consumer-oriented regulation that be­
gan to emerge in the late 1960s and continues even now. In those 
instances, regulation simply did not create rents for the regulated 
industry - although it did benefit others, such as manufacturers of 
pollution control equipment, who may well have participated in the 
legislative process. Moreover, even well-organized industries were 
unable to resist the imposition of sometimes very costly measures 
while individuals, particularly in the case of environmental regu­
lation, were able to organize effectively notwithstanding their large 
number and small stakes. 
Second, and more fundamentally, the rent-creation model im­
plicitly treats politicians as passive players: "they do not actively 
enter the market for rents with their own demands" (p. 17). This 
aspect of the model, no doubt a carryover from the "consumer­
sovereignty model of private markets" (p. 17), closes off an area 
ripe for analysis. We all know that politicians need and actively 
seek out both votes and campaign contributions; economists can 
hardly ignore, therefore, the possibility that politicians seek out, or 
otherwise create, opportunities to use the legislative process in ful­
fillment of those needs. Finally, the model does not attend "to ways 
other than rent creation that a politician can obtain benefits from 
private individuals" (p. 18). Perhaps principal among those is the 
"ability of politicians to gain . . .  by causing losses to others" (p. 19), 
or, alternatively, by threatening to do so but forbearing when 
appeased. 
Thus does McChesney introduce his model of economic regu­
lation, in which rent creation is but a special case of politicians 
seeking to maximize their benefits from the legislative process. His 
more general proposition is that politicians have the opportunity to 
gain whenever they can credibly threaten to extract existing rents 
from private hands, whether those of producers or of consumers. 
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When all goes well, the threat will not have to be exercised: the 
threatened party will pay the politician to forbear from regulating, 
handing over a portion of the rents rather than losing all of them. 
When regulation does occur, therefore, it is because this process of 
threat, appeasement, and forbearance has failed. Perhaps trans­
action costs were insurmountable, or one side or the other behaved 
opportunistically. 
Clearly the opportunities for rent extraction abound, whereas 
the opportunities for rent creation are more limited. In any case, 
the relevant question, as McChesney poses it from the point of view 
of the legislator, is what strategy maximizes his revenue (pp. 22-23). 
Depending upon the particulars of the case, the most promising 
strategy may be offering to create rents for Industry A, threatening 
to extract rents from Industry B, or threatening to extract rents 
from Consumers C. 
McChesney identifies two general methods for rent extraction. 
The first is to threaten producers with a price reduction (or what is 
functionally the same thing, withdrawal of a privilege or permit pre­
viously granted by the state) (pp. 26-28); the second is to threaten 
to raise the industry's cost by imposing upon it some regulatory 
burden (p. 29). For both types of legislative proposal, McChesney 
adopts the term "milker bills," used by California legislators to de­
scribe legislative proposals that are intended not to pass, but to 
elicit contributions from those who would like to make sure they do 
not pass (pp. 29-30). (In other state capitols, they are reportedly 
called "cash cows," "juice bills," and "fetchers.") 
The phenomenon of legislation that is proposed for the purpose 
not of being enacted but of being bought off brings to mind a per­
sonal observation. In the mid-1980s, some members of Congress, 
borrowing an idea then current in the law reviews, proposed to 
amend the securities laws so as to require a federal rather than a 
state charter for some class of publicly owned corporations. The 
point of the proposal was nominally to assert federal control over 
various takeover tactics and defenses in the interest of preserving 
the integrity of the securities market. The intended effect was to 
insulate the managements of target companies from hostile take­
overs, at the expense of both their shareholders and those of the 
acquiring companies. As the Reagan Administration's monitor of 
this legislation, I could only conclude at the time that, while the bills 
may not have been conceived as milker bills, they were surely pur­
sued as such once the members realized how lucrative they could 
be. Publicly traded corporations on both sides of the issue, which is 
to say tender offerors and takeover targets, began furiously throw­
ing favors at thy relevant Congressmen for at least a few years while 
the threat (or promise) of legislation seemed credible. Then the 
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idea dropped off the legislative agenda for no discernible reason. 
But I digress. 
McChesney is quick to point out that rent extraction is socially 
costly, albeit perhaps less so than rent creation. "Even if politicians 
eventually allow themselves to be bought off, their minatory pres­
ence reduces the expected value of entrepreneurial ability and 
specific-capital investments" (p. 33). The results are to diminish the 
value of existing capital and reduce the incentive to invest; to in­
duce an inefficient preference for investment in "politically more 
mobile" (meaning less firm-specific) forms of capital and in under­
ground economic activity; and to incur the bargaining and other 
transaction costs of the extractive process (pp. 33-34). These in­
clude the costs of the legislative process (hearings, etc.) insofar as 
they are incurred solely to make legislative threats credible, and the 
time of lawyers, lobbyists, and legislators (assuming there is a so­
cially positive opportunity cost for legislators' time) (p. 34). 
McChesney elaborates the theory in several respects that we 
need not rehearse here. Suffice it to say, he analyzes the relative 
attraction of rent creation, as opposed to rent extraction, as a func­
tion of the elasticity of industry supply (pp. 34-36); explains how the 
legislative auction serves to elicit valuable information concerning 
the relative value of regulatory action versus inaction (pp. 36-37); 
examines the benefits of employing expert administrative agencies 
to extract rents from specialized industries (p. 37); and analyzes the 
problem of opportunistic behavior by politicians and their custom­
ers using the familiar heuristic of a game modeled upon the 
Prisoner's Dilemma (pp. 38-41). This leads him to the empirical 
question: "[D]o private actors in fact pay significant sums to induce 
government not to act?" (p. 42). 
The foregoing describes Part I of the book. In Part II, "Demon­
strations," McChesney offers such evidence as he can for the de­
scriptive validity of the model. Chapters are devoted respectively 
to anecdotal evidence, empirical tests, and application of the model 
to changes in the rate at which the Internal Revenue Code is 
amended. 
The Chapter on anecdotal evidence, entitled "Observing Extor­
tion: The Practice of Rent Extraction" (pp. 45-68), is not particu­
larly satisfying. It consists of alternately pointing out the ways in 
which politicians can legally profit personally from campaign contri­
butions, honoraria for speaking engagements, and in-kind benefits; 
and providing accounts of some instances in which threats to lower 
prices or increase costs were made, to the great consternation of the 
affected industries, but later abandoned. There is little attempt to 
gather "testimony" from those who have firsthand knowledge of 
what intervened between the threat and the forbearance. One can 
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only sympathize with the author's plight, however; such evidence is 
inherently difficult to come by, notwithstanding the lawfulness of 
the transactions. (How many miles of unexplored caves are there?) 
Perhaps the most suggestive alternative to the direct evidence 
upon which McChesney draws (pp. 66-68) is the analogy to under­
developed countries, in which rent extraction is practiced more 
openly, whether by the ruling individuals acting upon their own be­
half, or by the government acting as their agent. While there is no 
confusing a violent and corrupt environment in which foreign inves­
tors must pay to avoid everything from strikes to nationalization, 
and a highly developed country in which rents are extracted law­
fully and without violence, it is hard to believe that people who 
occupy positions of power do not exploit them in similar ways, 
though by different means, the world over. 
The Chapter entitled "Validating the Model: Empirical Tests of 
Rent Extraction" (pp. 69-85), is only slightly more satisfying. Here 
McChesney reports the results of studies looking at the wealth ef­
fect generated by the cycle of threat and forbearance. In particular, 
he recounts a study of Canadian firms that were the subjects of ad­
verse legislative threats later abandoned (pp. 73-77). The results 
are "consistent with the strongest form of the rent extraction 
model" (p. 76). Although announcement of the threat depressed 
the prices of the affected firms' shares, retraction of the threats did 
not cause the firms' shares to recover their lost market value. "The 
implication is either that politicians were correctly expected to ex­
tract nearly all the rents, or that failure to negotiate a payoff was 
considered to be a remote possibility" (p. 77). 
Relatedly, Mcchesney examines the effect that the Clinton 
Administration's health care proposals had upon the value of 
shares in pharmaceutical companies (pp. 77-78). "It is particularly 
interesting that the November 1994 Republican electoral victory 
did not restore to pharmaceutical firms the wealth they had lost. In 
the end, the threatened firms had paid good money for nothing: 
their wealth was diminished, and no legislation was passed" (p. 78). 
In other words, the threat was raised, the wealth was shared, and 
the threat was abandoned, leaving the nominally unregulated firms 
poorer if not wiser. 
Event studies of this sort are unavoidably subject to certain criti­
cisms and qualifications, the significance of which can be dimin­
ished only if enough subsequent studies tum up similar results. 
What McChesney has already done, however, is sufficiently sug­
gestive to warrant those further studies. 
Finally, in Part III, "Extensions," McChesney takes up the im­
plications of his work for various fields of inquiry. In particular, he 
devotes chapters to optimal taxation (pp. 113-32), interest group or-
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ganization (pp. 133-55), and the prospects for improving the model 
and addressing additional issues (pp. 156-70). The chapter on opti­
mal taxation is full of interesting insights. For instance, McChesney 
explains why government services subject to user fees, such as graz­
ing rights on federal lands and USDA meat and poultry inspections, 
are chronically underpriced (pp. 120-24). Underpricing causes gov­
ernments to deliver services to the few at a loss borne by the many 
(all taxpayers), but enables politicians to threaten the few with an 
increase in user charges. McChesney also analyzes tax funds that 
are "earmarked" for a specific purpose (pp. 124-31). The supposed 
beneficiaries have no enforceable property rights in the funds and 
must compete, by conferring the usual emoluments, to get politi­
cians to release the money for its intended purpose. Examples 
abound, but perhaps the most familiar in recent years has been the 
difficulty that airport authorities have had getting access to the 
"trust fund" established to finance airport construction. 
On the costs and benefits of interest group organization, 
McChesney's analysis is particularly intriguing. He points out that 
being organized itself has costs and benefits. Only the organized 
can effectively fork over the payment necessary to obtain regulation 
- or to avoid it. 
Organization increases the ability to add to the group's surplus by 
becoming a transferee of others' surplus. Though once organized, a 
particular group will always offer more to keep its own surplus than 
competing groups will pay to have it transferred; organizing therefore 
gives politicians greater incentives to threaten a group's existing sur­
plus. [pp. 151-52] 
There is much more on the subject of interest group organization, 
but the foregoing point is enough to illustrate the productivity of 
McChesney's thesis; everywhere he looks with the aid of his model, 
he sees things in a new light. 
Not the least interesting is the observation with which he closes 
the chapter on interest group organization: 
In the absence of transaction costs, all regulatory activity would be rent 
extraction. Existing owners of rights to future capital flows or present 
wealth will always pay at least as much, and usually more, to keep 
what they have rather than have it transferred away. Regulation en­
sues only when the transaction costs of avoiding expropriation - of 
achieving a rent-extraction contract - prove prohibitive . 
. . . To say that regulation occurred is to say that someone who 
valued the resources more - their owner in the current period -
failed to acquire them for the subsequent period. In other words, reg­
ulation is proof of failure in the market for political contracts. That 
regulation represents political market failure is terribly ironic; not so 
long ago economists were analyzing regulation as a result of private 
market failure. [pp. 154-55] 
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The irony is terrible and delicious, especially for those of us who 
have long believed that market failure is a rare beast indeed.14 
In his final chapter, McChesney identifies outstanding issues to 
which he has no present answers. For example, why are the rents of 
some groups and not of others extracted (pp. 159-61)? Why do we 
sometimes see parties on both sides of a rent transfer issue paying 
politicians when only one side can win (pp. 161-62)? And perhaps 
most intriguing of all, why is it that "politicians' returns from rent 
extraction are so small, relative to the expropriable wealth 
threatened" (p. 162)? One prior study estimated that politicians 
skimmed only about five percent of the wealth they transferred (p. 
163). The situation reminds McChesney of the relative gains to bid­
ding and target firms in corporate takeovers; bidding firms drive up 
the premium paid for the shares of the target and in the end realize 
only modest profits themselves. Perhaps a more suggestive analogy 
is to spies, who typically receive payments that are very modest rel­
ative to the value of the secrets they transfer. Are politicians, like 
spies, constrained by the need not to live too well, lest they attract 
unwanted attention - in this case from voters? Or is the relevant 
constraint imposed by voters not upon how they live, for most of 
the proceeds go into campaign expenditures, but upon how much 
they collect from any one industry? 
Alternatively, perhaps the relatively low level of rents extracted 
merely reflects competition at work. Legislators must compete 
among themselves for the available rents. (Even a small legislative 
body has too many members to form an effective cartel.) In a 
chamber of 100, for example, in order to prevail a purchaser need 
accumulate only fifty-one votes, which may be had on the cheap if 
the opposing interest is not organized and actively acquiring votes 
in opposition to the proposal. The result may be fairly low prices 
except where a matter is hotly contested between two (or more) 
private interests. I am aware of no literature on the subject, but my 
impression is that legislators raise more money, other things being 
equal, from issues in which there are contending industries involved 
(such as banks versus insurance agents) than from those in which a 
single industry is seeking legislation without encountering signifi­
cant opposition. 
Curiously, McChesney does not develop the implications of his 
theory for relationships among legislators. Consider: if Legislator 
A puts forward a milker bill, the gains from those who contribute to 
make it go away will accrue not only to A, but to others on the 
relevant committee and to anyone else that may be able to suppress 
the bill. In other words, the author of the milker bill cannot secure 
14. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L. & 
EcoN. 11 {1973). 
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the full benefits that it generates (which is not to suggest there is an 
inefficiently small number of milker bills as a result). Viewed the 
other way around, Legislator A's bill is an opportunity for 
Legislator B, who can profit from opposing or supporting it, which­
ever is more lucrative. Indeed, how can A be sure a bill will fetch 
significant returns to him rather than to his colleagues? 
Questions like these will no doubt command the attention of a 
phalanx of public choice theorists for some time to come. Indeed, 
McChesney has in his book dictated an important research agenda 
for the future. Lawyers, economists, and especially doctoral stu­
dents should be duly grateful. Which reminds me of another story, 
one that I heard when I was still teaching law. A colleague in the 
mathematics department had brought back as a graduate student a 
young prodigy he had encountered during a sabbatical abroad. A 
couple of years later, when asked how his protege was doing, the 
professor replied somewhat gloomily, "Well, he has solved several 
problems that hadn't been solved before, but he just isn't asking 
questions that no one can answer." McChesney is doing both. 
